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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal non linear income tax of couples. We build a general
unitary model of labor supply and allow multidimensional heterogeneity in a discrete
type framework. We concentrate our analysis on the resulting intra-family labor allo-
cation of labor supplies and show that this analysis is strongly related to the choice of
the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We give a necessary condition to have
fully joint taxation in this framework and discuss some examples.
1 Introduction
The tax treatment of couples has been a heavily debated subject among economists
and noneconomists alike. Family taxation rules continue to differ significantly across
countries, even though there appears to be a trend towards more “individualized” tax
system. It does appear that family (or couple) based schemes tend to be replaced by
systems that rely on the individual as the relevant tax unit. Accordingly, an individual’s
tax liability depends less than previously on the spouse’s income. This trend has been
observed over the last decades in most tax reforms in OECD countries. Nevertheless,
in some countries like France, the systems remain to a substantial part family-based.
Accounting for the family dimension when studying optimal income taxation thus
appears to be highly important. Among economists, it is generally admitted that the
couple’s secondary earner is also the one with the higher elasticity of labor supply (e.g.
see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Following the traditional Ramsey rule, the secondary
wage earner should face a lower linear tax (see Boskin, 1975 and Boskin and Sheshin-
ski, 1983). This pleads in general for a tax unit that is based on individual incomes.
However, an individual’s welfare largely depends upon the total couple’s income. Thus
it may be desirable to introduce a certain degree of progressivity depending upon the
family’s income.
The literature on this topic is quite scarce and restrictive. Following the seminal
paper by Boskin (1975) and Boskin and Sheshinsky (1983), authors have usually con-
strained the analysis of optimal family income taxation to the framework of only linear
instruments.1 As a result, the choice of the tax unit only depends upon the difference
between optimal tax rates of the primary and the secondary earners: joint taxation is
desirable if and only if these two tax rates are equal.
In reality, the picture is however more complicated than that. The taxation of a
couple typically depends upon the primary and the secondary labor incomes. On one
extreme, there is pure joint taxation if the tax function depends only on the sum of
these two incomes. As a result, the marginal tax rate is the same for both spouses of
1Exemples are papers by Apps and Rees (1988, 1999) or more recently Kleven (2004).
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the same couple. On the other extreme we have individual taxation under which the tax
paid by the family is the addition of two tax functions each depending only upon one
spouse’s income. In this situation, the tax unit is purely based on individual incomes,
but this does not however preclude the case where both spouses’ marginal tax rates are
equal. Between these two polar cases, joint taxation and individual taxation, the most
widespread system is one of selective taxation under which secondary earners, usually
women, are taxed on a separate, lower, progressive tax schedule than that of primary
earners.
The design of the tax function is often expressed in terms of the choice of the
“tax unit”: couple versus individual. Thus joint taxation corresponds to choosing the
couple as the tax unit, with their combined income being the tax base while individual
and selective taxation have the individual as the tax unit and the individual income
as tax base. In this paper we study the conditions that lead to a specific tax system,
particularly the joint one. Our approach is in the tradition of non-linear optimal income
taxation. We thus assume away some of the considerations that can explain the observed
move towards individualization of tax rules. One of them is ethical and reflects the view
individuals should be given priority over couples in the name of responsibility. Another
one is informational: marital status is assumed to be observable. This is a strong
assumption because we live in a world with a wide variety of living arrangement and it
is not always easy for tax authorities to sort out them. Typically couples can pretend
living separately if they find it more attractive in terms of tax burden.
We study the optimal income taxation of couples in a nonlinear framework (Mirrlees,
1971). To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have studied this issue. The first
one is the paper by Shroyen (2003) who studies optimal nonlinear income taxation in a
setting where labor supply decisions are made within the household (couple) while the
tax schedule is by assumption based on individual filing. He shows that the household
structure and particularly the mating pattern affects the structure of an individual based
income tax. The second paper is the one by Kleven et al. (2005). They study a general
problem of optimum taxation of two wage earners family allowing multidimensional
differences across families within a unitary model (of family decision making). They are
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interested in determining whether the tax function is separable into two individuals and
independent tax schedules and in the asymptotic design of these tax functions.
Our contribution is very much complementary to the one of Kleven et al. (2005). We
use a general setting where families are composed of two wage earners each characterized
by a possibly different productivity (thus allowing for multidimensional heterogeneity).
Our paper also uses the basic unitary model of the family but we assume a discrete
distribution of productivities. We study the intra family allocation of labor supplies
that is implied by the tax system. In other words, we examine wether the optimal
(second-best) allocation distorts one spouse’s labor supply relative to that of the other’s
spouse for a given level of gross income earned by the family. This issue, in turn, is
strongly connected to the choice of tax unit. We show that pure joint taxation (with
total household income as tax base) is equivalent to having no distortion in the allocation
of both spouses’ labor supplies for a given level of family income. We derive a general
property stating if and how the intra-family allocation of labor is distorted. We also
show in more restrictive settings how this condition can be related to the primitives of
the model. To sum up, unlike Kleven et al. we are not interested in the separability
of the household tax function but we examine whether a non separable function should
depend solely on the sum of income or depend on the individual spouses income in a
more complicated way.
2 The model
2.1 Couples: preferences and productivities
Consider a couple composed of two individuals indexed by j = w, h. The couple’s
preferences over its net income x and labor supplies lj (j = w, h) are represented by
a quasi-concave family utility function U (x, lw, lh) , with ∂U/∂x > 0 and ∂U/∂lj < 0.
The society is composed of N types of couples indexed by superscript i (i = 1, . . . ,N)
who differ in their members’ labor productivities aiw and aih. The proportion of type
i couples in the economy is denoted by πi where
PN
i=1 πi = 1. The total number of
3
couples is normalized at one for notational convenience.2
2.2 Tax instruments and labor supply decisions
As in traditional models of optimal taxation, we assume that the individual productivi-
ties and labor supplies are not publicly observable. For any couple, however, before tax
incomes of each of the spouses, yiw = aiwliw and yih = a
i
hl
i
h are observable. The tax policy
consists of a non linear tax T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
on the labor incomes of the two wage earners.
This general tax function may exhibit some specific properties. In reality, tax functions
range from “unitary taxation” to “separable taxation”.3 In the first case, the tax func-
tion only depends upon the total income of the couple i.e. T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
= eT ¡yiw + yih¢.
In the second case, the tax levied on the income of one spouse does not depend upon
the income earned by the other spouse i.e. T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
= bT ¡yiw¢+ bT ¡yih¢. As mentioned
in the introduction, much of the existing literature, has concentrated on the class of
linear tax functions. The main question addressed in these papers is whether or not the
income of both spouses should be taxed at the same (marginal) tax rate. We reconsider
this question with nonlinear tax instruments. In such a setting the issue of equal or un-
equal marginal tax rate within the couple is particularly interesting because it is closely
related to the issue of the choice of the tax base. The requirement that marginal tax
rates are equal, namely
∂T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yiw = ∂T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yih, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
is a necessary condition to have a unitary taxation system. It is also sufficient in
the sense that when this condition holds for all couples the optimal allocation can be
2This model of the couple is a fairly general reduced form of the unitary model. It is consistent
with the existence of “private” and “public” goods in the household and with the determination of
consumption and labor supply levels though a bargaining process (where the weights are exogenous
and not affected by the tax policy). From that perspective, one can think of U(x, lw, ly) as the value
function associated with the problem of allocating a household budget x to the various consumption
goods, given labor supply levels lw and ly. In other words, U(x, lw, ly) specifies the maximum level of
the households objective (e.g., a weighted sum of utilities or a Nash product) given labor supplies and
given its total (after tax budget). Using this reduced form rather than the original household objective
in the optimal tax problem does not involve any loss of generality as long as differential commodity
taxation is not possible, for instance because individual consumption levels (and thus the allocation of
goods within the couple) are not publicly observable.
3This is admittedly a highly stylized and incomplete typology. In particular it abstracts from the
tax treatment of children and relies on the assumption that there are no single individuals.
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implemented by a unitary tax function.4
Condition (1) is particularly interesting because it implies that the tax system does
not distort the intra-family allocation of labor supply. To be more precise, for a given
level of after tax income the labor allocation between the two spouses is not affected
by such a tax function. To see this, note that for a given level of after tax income
x = yw + yh − T (yw, yh), the couple chooses (yw, yh) to solve:
max
yh,yf
U
µ
x,
yw
aw
,
yh
ah
¶
(2)
s.t. x = yh + yw − T (yw, yh) (3)
Deriving the FOC and rearranging yields
MRSyw,yh =
∂U/∂yh
∂U/∂yw
=
aw
ah
∂U/∂lh
∂U/∂lw
=
1− ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh
1− ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw
. (4)
The tradeoff between yw and yh is not distorted (with respect to a first-best and/or
laissez-faire outcome) whenMRSyw,yh = 1. This is of course always the case when there
are no taxes at all. More interestingly, equation (4) shows that the tradeoff remains
undistorted as long as ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh = ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw, i.e., when the marginal tax
on labor income is the same for both spouses.5 Based on the same arguments, we will
say that the choice between yw and yh is distorted towards more yh (resp. yw) when
∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw > ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh (resp. ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw < ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh).
An alternative view on these distortions consists in saying that the choice between
yw and yh is distorted towards less yw if couples who choose to decrease yw pay less
taxes for a given level of total before tax income GI = yw + yh that is when:6
dT (yh, yw)
dyw
¯¯¯¯
yw+yh=GI
=
∂T (yh, yw)
∂yw
− ∂T (yh, yw)
∂yh
> 0
4Which does not necessarily imply that all implementing tax functions are unitary.
5When marginal taxes are different from zero, leisure-labor and/or domestic labor-market labor
tradeoffs are distorted. However, the intra-familly allocation of labor supply (as specified by problem
(2)) remains undistorted when marginal tax rates are the same for both spouses.
6Similarly, there will be a distortion towards less yh in the (yw, yh) tradeoff when:
dT (yh, yw)
dyw
¯¯¯¯
GI
=
∂T (yh, yw)
∂yw
− ∂T (yh, yw)
∂yh
< 0.
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3 The optimal tax function
We characterize the (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations that are obtained by max-
imizing a weighted sum of utilities subject to the resource constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraints. The weight of a type i couple is denoted αiπi with αi ≥ 0
and
P
i α
i = 1. For the remainder of the paper, we denote the utility function of a type i
couple by U i
¡
xi, yiw, yih
¢
= U
¡
xi, yiw/aiw, yih/a
i
h
¢
. Because types are private information
the following incentive compatibility constraints apply for any i, j = 1, . . . , N,
U i = U i
¡
xi, yiw, y
i
h
¢
≥ U ij = U i
³
xj , yjw, y
j
h
´
. (5)
In words, couple imust not be able to achieve a (strictly) larger utility level by mimicking
couple j, i.e., by consuming the consumption bundle designed for couple j.
Formally, a Pareto efficient allocation is the solution to the following problem:
max
xiz ,yiw,yif
NX
i=1
αiπiU i
s.t
NX
i=1
πi
¡
yiw + y
i
h − xi
¢
≥ G (6)
U i ≥ U ij i, j = 1.......N (7)
where G is the exogenous revenue requirement while U i and U ij are defined by (5).
Denoting the multipliers of constraints (6) and (7) by μ and λij respectively, one
can write the Lagrangian expression as follows:
Λ =
NX
i=1
αiπiU i + μ
"
NX
i=1
πi
¡
yiw + y
i
h − xi
¢
−G
#
+
NX
i,j=1
λij
£
U i − U ij
¤
The first order conditions with respect to yiw and yih, i = 1....N, are given by:
∂Λ
∂yiw
=
"
αiπi +
NX
i=1
λij
#
∂U i
∂yiw
+ πiμ−
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yiw
= 0 (8)
∂Λ
∂yih
=
"
αiπi +
NX
i=1
λij
#
∂U i
∂yih
+ πiμ−
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yih
= 0 (9)
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Denoting γi = αiπi +
PN
i=1 λ
ij and combining equations (8) and (9) yields:
γi
∂U i
∂yiw
MRSiyw,yh + γ
i∂U
i
∂yiw
−
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yiw
MRSjiyw,yh −
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yiw
= 0
where MRSjiyw,yh = ∂U
ji/∂yih/∂U
ji/∂yiw. After some rearrangements this yields:
MRSiyw,yh =
γi ∂U
i
∂yiw
−
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂yiw
γi ∂U i∂yiw −
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂Y iw
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
(10)
Combining (10) with (4) and rearranging then establishes the following proposition;
see Appendix A.
Proposition 1 (i) We have ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yiw T ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yih if and only if
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yiw
"
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
− 1
#
S 0 (11)
(ii) A Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented by a unitary tax function T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
=eT ¡yiw + yih¢ if and only if condition (11) holds as equality for all couples i = 1, . . .N .
Proposition 1 provides a general condition under which a couple’s tradeoff between
the spouses’ labor supplies should not be distorted; specifically this is true when the
LHS of (11) is equal to zero. Otherwise, it ought to be distorted and the direction of
the distortion is provided by (11). When the LHS of this condition is negative, w faces
a higher marginal tax rate than h and the tradeoff is distorted towards more yh. If it is
negative, we have the opposite result. This condition is general in the sense that it is
valid whatever the pattern of binding incentive constraints and for any welfare weights.
The price to pay for this level of generality is that the condition involves endogenous
variables. We shall show below that (11) reduces to a condition on the primitives of the
model in special cases. In those cases the interpretation will also be facilitated. In the
meantime let us have a look at the interpretation of the general condition.
To do this, let us first compare the choices of labor supplies, (yw, yh) , by couples i
and j for a given level of gross income GI = yw+yh. Each couple chooses a pair (yw, yh)
that lies at the point of tangency between indifference curves and the gross income line
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i.e., where MRSjyw,yh = MRS
i
yw,yh = 1. Figure 1 illustrates this choice in the (yh, yw)
plane where couples j and i choose a different combination of spouses’ gross incomes. In
the case that is depicted, the marginal rate of substitution between yw and yh is larger
(in absolute value) for couple j than for couple i, so that it chooses a higher yw and a
lower yh. Now assume that the incentive compatibility constraint preventing couple j
to mimic couple i is binding and note that at the point
¡
yiw, yih
¢
couple j has a steeper
indifference curve than couple i. To make couple i’s consumption bundle
¡
yiw, yih
¢
less
attractive for couple j, it is then desirable to distort the choice of couple i towards less
yw (moving to the right along the income line). In other words, a higher marginal tax on
yiw would be desirable to relax an otherwise binding incentive compatibility constraint.
Alternatively, when the marginal rate of substitution is lower (in absolute value) for
couple j then it is desirable to distort the choice of couple i towards more yw i.e. to
have a higher marginal tax on yh.
So far we have concentrated on one pair of couples. However, the solution may
well imply that several incentive constraints towards type i are binding. Condition
(11) considers all couples j for which the incentive compatibility constraints towards
the type i couple is binding i.e. all the j such that λji > 0. For each binding incentive
compatibility constraint, there is a desirable distortion on the (yiw, yih) choice. As argued
above, the sign of this distortion depends upon the difference between the two couples
in the marginal rates of substitution. Proposition 1 states that the total distortion on
couple i’s
¡
yiw, yih
¢
tradeoff depends upon a weighted sum of distortions imposed by each
binding self-selection constraints in which i is the mimicked type.
Observe that a couple i such that λji = 0 for all j (if it exists) never faces a distortion
(the LHS of (11)) is always equal to zero). This is the counterpart to the traditional
no distortion at the top result in this multi-dimensional setting. For all other types i
(with at least one λji > 0) the LHS of (11) may or may not be zero, depending on the
marginal rates of substitution of the mimicker and the mimicked couples. A sufficient
condition for this to be the case is that MRSjiyw,yh = MRS
i
yw,yh at the point
¡
yiw, yih
¢
for all pairs of couples with λji > 0. In words, this (sufficient) condition requires that
all pairs of couples linked by a binding incentive constraint have the same marginal rate
8
jh wy y GI+ =
i
hy
wy
Figure 1: The (yw, yh) choice for a given level of gross income GI.
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of substitution (at the labor supply bundle of the mimicked couple).
A more intuitive version of this condition, based solely on exogenous variables, can be
obtained for specific classes of utility functions. The following proposition is established
in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Assume couples utility functions are of the form
U (x, l) = u (x)− lβw − l
β
h , (12)
where β ≥ 1. Then, a sufficient condition to have ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yiw = ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yih
is:
ajw
ajh
=
aiw
aih
for all i, j = 1...N . (13)
In words, condition (13) requires that the ratio of the two spouses’ productivities be
the same for all couples. The underlying mating pattern thus implies a perfect corre-
lation between the two productivities of the two spouses. In a society with assortative
mating as opposed to random (or reverse) mating condition (13) could be verified. Some
studies suggest that most industrial societies are moving towards assortative mating:
couples are becoming more and more similar over time; see e.g., Rose (2001).
The case of iso-elastic utilities is further explored in the following two-types exam-
ple. It provides a nice illustration and more significantly, it yields more precise results
regarding the sign of the distortions.
4 A two types example
Suppose there are only two types of couples in the economy. The couple 1 is character-
ized by higher productivities than couple 2, i.e., a1w ≥ a2w and a1h ≥ a2h. Assume further
that the incentive compatibility constraint preventing type 1 to mimic type 2 is binding
i.e. λ12 > 0.7 In this case, there is no distortion for type 1. Furthermore, Proposition
7This is equivalent to assume that α2 is high enough in the objective of the government.
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1 (i) is equivalent to
∂T
¡
y2w, y
2
h
¢
/∂y2w R ∂T
¡
y2w, y
2
h
¢
/∂y2h
⇔
MRS12yw,yh R MRS
2
yw,yh .
With iso-elastic disutility of labor, so that U (x, l) = u (x)− lβw− lβh (β ≥ 1), one has:
MRS2yw,yh
MRS12yw,yh
=
µ
a2w/a2h
a1w/a1h
¶β
(14)
Consequently, a necessary and sufficient condition to have a solution that can be im-
plemented by a unitary tax function is that the ratio between the spouses produc-
tivities is the same for both types of couples. This is essentially just an illustra-
tion of Proposition 2. More interestingly, (14) implies that a2w/a2h > a
1
w/a1h yields
∂T
¡
y2w, y2h
¢
/∂y2w < ∂T
¡
y2w, y2h
¢
/∂y2h. In words, in the low productivity couple spouse w
faces a lower marginal tax rate than spouse h, when the ratio between the productivities
of w and h is larger in the mimicked couple than in the mimicking couple. Put differ-
ently, female labor supply would be encouraged (relative to the male labor supply) in
the low productivity couple when the wife is relatively more productive in that house-
hold than in the high productivity couple. With the considered profile of the spouses
productivity ratios such a distortion has a more significant impact on the utility of the
mimicking couple than on that of the mimicked couple and, as explained in the previ-
ous section, the differential taxation of the spouses incomes relaxes a binding incentive
constraint. Conversely, a2w/a2h < a
1
w/a1h yields ∂T
¡
y2w, y2h
¢
/∂y2w > ∂T
¡
y2w, y2h
¢
/∂y2h and
we have exactly the opposite result (but the same intuition).
5 Conclusion
Understanding the implications of optimal taxation theory for the fiscal treatment of
couples is a big challenge. This paper is an attempt to explore one aspect of the problem.
Specifically, we provide a general framework to study the intra-family labor allocation
under an optimal nonlinear income tax schedule. Whether this allocation is distorted
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or not depends upon the tax unit choice. The literature distinguishes between two “tax
units”: the couple vs the individual. It also considers three tax systems: joint taxation,
individual taxation and selective taxation. The first corresponds to choosing the couple
as the tax unit while the second and the third have the individual as the tax unit.
We focus on joint taxation and provide the conditions that lead to such a system.
We consider first a general setting and then two more restricted frameworks. Not
surprisingly, these conditions are rather restrictive. For instance, when the family utility
function is separable and the labor disutility function is isoelastic, a necessary condition
for a pure joint taxation is the equality of the ratio between the two earners’ productivity
across all couples. We also study how the spouses respective labor supply decisions are
distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we show in a two-type
example that the way this ratio varies has a direct impact on the now different marginal
tax of the two spouses.
It is important to note that the restrictive character of the assumptions that imply
joint taxation does not mean that the assumptions needed to obtain separate taxation
are less restrictive.
While allowing a quite general framework, our analysis suffers from an important
drawback namely that it is based on the so-called unitary approach. It is well known
that this approach is usually not supported by the empirical evidence. In the future,
we plan to study such problems within the framework of collective models initiated by
Chiappori (1988).
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Combining (4) and (10) yields
1− ∂T
¡
yih, y
i
w
¢
/∂yih
1− ∂T
¡
yih, yiw
¢
/∂yiw
=
γi ∂U
i
∂yiw
−
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂yiw
γi ∂Ui∂yiw −
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂yiw
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
,
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so that
∂T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yiw T ∂T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yih ⇔
γi ∂U
i
∂yiw
−
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂yiw
γi ∂Ui∂yiw −
PN
j=1 λ
ji ∂Uji
∂yiw
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
T 1. (15)
Numerator and denominator of (15) are negative. Consequently this property is equiv-
alent to
T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yiw T ∂T
¡
yiw, y
i
h
¢
/∂yih ⇔
γi
∂U i
∂yiw
−
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂yiw
S γi∂U
i
∂yiw
−
NX
j=1
λji
∂U ji
∂Y iw
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
.
Simplifying and rearranging the last inequality establishes to Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
When preferences are represented by (12) one has:
MRSiyw,yh =
∂U i/∂yih
∂U i/∂yiw
=
µ
aiw
aih
¶β µ yih
yiw
¶β−1
,
MRSjiyw,yh =
∂U ji/∂yih
∂U ji/∂yiw
=
Ã
ajw
ajh
!β µ
yih
yiw
¶β−1
,
so that
MRSjiyw,yh
MRSiyw,yh
=
Ã
ajw/a
j
h
aiw/aih
!β
.
Consequently, it follows from Proposition 1, that ajw/a
j
h = a
i
w/aih for all i, j = 1...N,
implies MRSjiyw,yh/MRS
i
yw,yh − 1 = 0 and ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yiw = ∂T
¡
yiw, yih
¢
/∂yih.
13
References
[1] Apps, P. and R. Rees, 1988, Taxation and the household, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 75, 355—369.
[2] Apps, P. and R. Rees, 1999, Individual vs. Joint Taxation in Models with Household
Production, Journal of Political Economy, 107, 393—403.
[3] Blundell R. and T. MaCurdy, 1999, Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Ap-
proaches, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics vol
3A, Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.
[4] Boskin, M., 1975, Efficiency aspects of the differentiated tax treatment of market
and household economic activity, Journal of Public Economics, 4, 1—25.
[5] Boskin M.J. and E. Sheshinski, 1983, Optimal Tax treatment of the Family: Mar-
ried Couples, Journal of Public Economics, 20, 281—297.
[6] Brett, C., 2006, Optimal nonlinear taxes for families, International Tax and Public
Finance,
[7] Chiappori P.-A., 1988, Rational Household Labor Supply, Econometrica, 56, 1,63—
89.
[8] Chiappori P.-A., B. Fortin and G. Lacroix, 2002, Household Labor Supply, Sharing
Rule and the Marriage Market, Journal of Political Economy, 110, 1, 37—72.
[9] Kleven H.J., 2004, Optimum Taxation and the Allocation of Time, Journal of
Public Economics 88, 545—557.
[10] Kleven H.J., C.T. Kreiner and E. Saez (2005), The Optimal Income Taxation of
Couples, Manuscript.
[11] Mirrlees, J A., 1971, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation,
Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175—208.
14
[12] Rose, E., 2001, Marriage and assortative mating: how have the pattern changed?,
University of Washington, unpublished.
[13] Schroyen, F., (2003), Redistributive taxation and the household: the case of indi-
vidual filings, Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2527—2547.
15
